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CREATORS, INNOVATORS, AND APPROPRIATION 
MECHANISMS 
Sean M. O’Connor* 
INTRODUCTION 
Now that Congress’s House Judiciary Committee has undertaken a re-
view of current copyright law,1 and the Register of Copyrights, Maria Pal-
lante, has called for the “Next Great Copyright Act,”2 sides are being drawn 
by various interest groups. Perhaps following the pitting of information 
technology firms against bio-chem and pharma firms in the patent reform 
battles leading to the America Invents Act,3 some interest groups want to 
divide the copyright reform debates into “innovators” and “creators.” Much 
of this seems driven by large tech firms such as Google, along with advoca-
cy groups such as the Electronic Frontier Foundation (“EFF”) who are 
aligned with them, as they push for copyright reform. The narrative being 
developed is that tech firms are simply trying to create the innovative tech-
nologies and digital platforms of the future, while being dragged down by 
behemoth content owners who are trying to thwart this progress to maintain 
the status quo of an analog content world that no longer exists.4  
  
 * Boeing International Professor and Assistant Dean for Law, Business, and Technology Initia-
tives, University of Washington School of Law (Seattle); Senior Scholar, Center for the Protection of 
Intellectual Property (CPIP), George Mason University School of Law. The Author would like to thank 
Adam Mossoff, Mark Schultz, and Matt Barblan at CPIP, and Jessica Gallinaro, Jake McMurdo, and 
other staff at the George Mason Law Review. All errors are the Author’s own. 
 1 Press Release, House Judiciary Committee, Chairman Goodlatte Announces Comprehensive 
Review of Copyright Law (Apr. 24, 2013), http://judiciary.house.gov/index.cfm/press-
releases?ID=1B5C521A-D006-B517-9949-43E692E1E52E.  
 2 Maria A. Pallante, The Next Great Copyright Act, 36 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 315, 315 (2013); The 
Register’s Call for Updates to U.S. Copyright Law, Statement Before the H. Subcomm. on Courts, 
Intellectual Prop. & the Internet of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. (2013) (statement of Maria 
A. Pallante, Register of Copyrights and Director, U.S. Copyright Office), available at 
http://copyright.gov/regstat/2013/regstat03202013.html (last visited Ma. 2, 2015). 
 3 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (“AIA”), Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011). While 
patent reform had been considered by Congress for a number of years before passage of AIA, serious 
disputes over proposed changes to patent injunctions and damages between the information technology 
industry, on the one hand, and the bio-chem industries, on the other, had slowed down efforts to find an 
acceptable compromise. See, e.g., Diane Bartz, U.S. Battle Over Patent Reform Headed for Compro-
mise?, REUTERS (Mar. 10, 2009), http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/03/10/us-patents-idUSTRE
5295J920090310.  
 4 See, e.g., NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., COPYRIGHT IN THE DIGITAL ERA: 
BUILDING EVIDENCE FOR POLICY 1, 7-8 (Stephen A. Merrill & William J. Raduchel eds., 2013). 
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But this simple narrative is quite misleading and harmful to the kind of 
rational, objective debate necessary to accommodate the newest forms of 
digital and social media in the copyright ecosystem. Great creators are in-
novators and great innovators are creators. The content companies, includ-
ing large legacy movie and music studios, have developed impressive new 
digital technologies. And digital technology and platform distribution firms 
are increasingly creating new content. In the middle, industries such as vid-
eo gaming have always existed at the crossroads of developing cutting edge 
technology and content. What society is really witnessing is an explosion of 
creative innovation across a range of fields. 
But no matter what the field or form, creative innovation relies on 
some mode of appropriation. Without it, anyone can copy or use the inno-
vation without payment or attribution to the original producer. In such a 
world, it seems likely that few will invest significant time or resources into 
fully developing and implementing their ideas for a particular creative in-
novation. They will still have the ideas, and they may be willing to imple-
ment them in some inexpensive, fast manner. While that may work for 
some kinds of creative innovation, it does not work for many others. Copy-
right is only one appropriation mechanism. There are many others, includ-
ing the areas of intellectual property (“IP”) outside of copyright. 
A problem that underlies the emerging innovator-creator copyright de-
bates is that creative innovators naturally want their inputs to be “free” (in 
both the cost and repurposing senses), while they need their outputs to be 
appropriable if they want to receive a return on investment for their innova-
tions. As argued below, this appears to have led some tech firms and their 
advocates to engage in a diversionary sleight of hand in which they seek to 
minimize the appropriation mechanisms of those providing their inputs, 
while hiding or downplaying robust efforts to appropriate their outputs.5 
This Essay explores the current state of this phenomenon, especially with 
regard to digital and social media. It argues that policymakers need to focus 
on this broader perspective and not allow some interested players to narrow 
the debate to the appropriation mechanisms of only one stakeholder group 
in creative innovation ecosystems.  
I. “CREATORS VS. INNOVATORS” IS A FALSE DICHOTOMY  
What is a “creator” that is not also an “innovator,” and vice versa? It 
may be tempting when observing current debates to adopt the apparent 
popular sense that creators are “artists” who produce aesthetic “creative 
expression,” while innovators are entrepreneurs who produce “technology.” 
  
 5 See infra Part III. 
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As I have written elsewhere,6 this perspective also unfortunately maps onto 
a gendered distinction between “feminine” aesthetic arts and “masculine” 
math and science-based technology.7 This dubious distinction is so perva-
sive that it seems to underlie the common division of IP into “soft IP” for 
the creative arts (e.g., copyright and trademark) and “hard IP” for industrial 
technology (e.g., patents and trade secrets).8 But when one digs deeper into 
what so-called creators and innovators actually do, the existing dichoto-
my—and seemingly tight correlation to “artists” and “entrepreneurs,” re-
spectively—largely evaporates. 
First, the distinction between innovative and replicative activities is 
the key to thinking about what constitutes innovation. As Professor William 
Baumol notes in the entrepreneurship management literature, “innovative 
entrepreneurs” are those who “locate new ideas and . . . put them into ef-
fect.”9 By contrast, the replicative entrepreneur is one who can function in 
the broader, earlier sense of “entrepreneur” as simply anyone who under-
takes a new venture.10 The innovative entrepreneur commercializes new 
kinds of goods or services, including new ways of producing or distributing 
them.  
In this light, one can see first and foremost that many artists and entre-
preneurs are replicative. The artist who produces a nominally new creative 
expression, but which fits closely within an existing genre and breaks no 
new ground, is not innovative. However, the work may have other signifi-
cant value, and thus this understanding is not meant to denigrate such 
works. Equally so, many entrepreneurs are small business owners who have 
opened a franchise of an existing chain of goods or service providers, or 
who open a new restaurant or store within an established industry (e.g., 
pizzerias, dry cleaners). When there is nothing notably different about the 
goods or services, or the way they are produced or distributed, then the 
business is replicative and not innovative. Again, “replicative” need not be 
pejorative. There can be great value in replicative businesses, especially 
where they fill an unmet need in a neighborhood. However, this illustrates 
why “entrepreneur” is not co-extensive with “innovator.” 
In contrast to replicative entrepreneurship, innovative entrepreneurship 
is that which provides new kinds of products or services, or ways of pro-
ducing or distributing them. While Professor Joseph Schumpeter’s “creative 
  
 6 See SEAN M. O’CONNOR, METHOD+OLOGY AND THE MEANS OF INNOVATION (forthcoming 
June 2016) (manuscript, ch. 4, at 1) (on file with the author). 
 7 See id. (manuscript, ch. 4, at 55).  
 8 Id. (manuscript, ch. 4, at 48).  
 9 WILLIAM J. BAUMOL, THE MICROTHEORY OF INNOVATIVE ENTREPRENEURSHIP 18 (2010). 
 10 Id. In fact “entrepreneur” began its modern meaning when Richard Cantillon, the eigtheenth 
century pioneer of entrepreneurship studies, imported it without translation as the French word for 
“undertaker” (in the sense of anyone embarking on an undertaking) in his English language writings. 
See RICHARD CANTILLON, ESSAI SUR LA NATURE DU COMMERCE EN GÉNÉRAL 388-89 (Henry Higgs 
ed. & trans., Macmillan & Co. 1931) (1755). 
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destruction”—the “disruptive innovation” that upends incumbents in an 
existing business space11—is often held as the archetype of innovative en-
trepreneurship, it is not the only kind. Incremental innovation that results in 
evolution within existing industries or businesses can also be quite valua-
ble. 
At the same time, there can be creative aesthetic works that establish 
or modify genres, techniques, or modes of audience interaction. These 
works should count as “innovation” even though the innovation literature is 
largely focused on technology innovation. A new catchy tune firmly within 
an existing genre such as country music is valuable, but it is not innovation. 
However, a new song or sound that crosses over genres or creates a new 
genre is innovative. For example, the seminal collaboration between com-
posers Antonio Carlos Jobim and Vinícius de Moraes on “Girl from Ipane-
ma,” as recorded by João Gilberto, his wife Astrud Gilberto, and Stan Getz, 
arguably launched a new version of the Brazilian genre bossa nova that was 
accessible to United States audiences in the 1960s.12 Similarly, bands like 
Uncle Tupelo, and successors such as Wilco, created a sub- or crossover 
genre called “alt-country” in the 1990s.13 
Turning to what constitutes creativity, it has become clear that indi-
viduals from many walks of life exercise creativity in their activities. While 
it is difficult to precisely define creativity, the general notion of it actually 
seems to overlap with innovation.14 Creativity can be seen as individuals or 
groups coming up with new artifacts or methods that draw on inspiration 
from multiple sources.15 Sometimes linked to “divergent” thinking in which 
a person synthesizes multiple seemingly unrelated ideas,16 creativity often 
generates entirely new kinds of works. But creativity is not limited to this; 
rather it can also be used to produce new iterations of works in an existing 
field of activity. At the same time, a nominally new work that is largely 
replicative of existing works in the same field, with perhaps trivial varia-
tions, would likely not be viewed as creative.  
  
 11 See JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 83 (3d ed. 1950) 
(introducing “Creative Destruction” and explaining its effects on capitalist industries); CLAYTON M. 
CHRISTENSEN, THE INNOVATOR’S DILEMMA: WHEN NEW TECHNOLOGIES CAUSE GREAT FIRMS TO 
FAIL, at xii-xiv (1997) (introducing “disruptive innovation” to describe the technological threat that 
develops generally from within particular industries). 
 12 Stan Getz had already been releasing Latin-inspired jazz records including bossa nova and 
samba tracks beginning in 1961, but it was the collaboration with Gilberto on “Getz/Gilberto” (featuring 
“Girl from Ipanema”) that gave the new (to the U.S.) genre widespread fame and established it perma-
nently here. See Suzel Ana Reily, Tom Jobin and the Bossa Nova Era, 15 POPULAR MUSIC 1, 1 (1996). 
 13 See Alternative Country, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alternative_country (last 
modified Nov. 26, 2014, 6:20 PM). 
 14 See, e.g., Gregory N. Mandel, To Promote the Creative Process: Intellectual Property Law and 
the Psychology of Creativity, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1999, 1999 (2011). 
 15 Id. at 2004-05; O’CONNOR, supra note 6 (manuscript, ch. 1, at 7). 
 16 See Mandel, supra note 14, at 2004-05. 
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In this way, it should be clear that innovators are often creative, and 
creators are often innovative. Both take inspiration from multiple sources—
this after all is a big part of “outside of the box” thinking—and synthesize it 
into a new type of artifact or way of doing things. A more nuanced ap-
proach places creativity as a necessary part of innovation.17 Creativity and 
innovation may sit along the same continuum with the former perhaps ex-
tending somewhat further down towards derivative works (in the artistic not 
legal sense) than the latter, which requires new (sub)categories of artifacts 
or methods. 
In sum, “creator” is not co-extensive with “artist” just as “innovator” 
is not co-extensive with “entrepreneur.” Artists are usually creators and in 
many cases innovate within their field, developing entirely new genres or 
techniques. Entrepreneurs are innovative when they fall within Baumol’s 
subcategory of “innovative entrepreneurs,” and to innovate they generally 
rely on their creative skills. Accordingly, the temptation to make synonyms 
out of artist:creator and entrepreneur:innovator should be resisted. Further, 
the alleged contrast between “creator” and “innovator” is not so stark, and 
in fact may be counterproductive. 
Instead of contrasting creativity and innovation, U.S. copyright and 
patent law history reveal that the phrase “genius and skill” traditionally 
characterized both. In nineteenth century cases, judges used this phrase to 
describe what both authors and inventors did.18 But this was not some idle 
conjunction of terms that sounded well together or overlapped. Instead, 
“genius” was quite distinct from “skill.” Most important, “genius” did not 
encompass the modern popular sense of high intelligence. Rather, it was the 
older sense of pure inspiration with origins in the “divine madness” men-
tioned by Plato and the Ancient Greeks.19 Derived from the same linguistic 
root that led to “genie,” “genius” was secularized in the Renaissance to 
remove the troubling supernatural—especially demonic—elements.20 
Stripped of this baggage, this mysterious inspiration that could come to 
anyone, whether they had experience and skills in a particular field or not, 
became a major desideratum in the Renaissance and early modern period in 
Europe.21  
But the fine arts was not the only area that prized “genius.” If any-
thing, it was even more prized amongst the emerging class of engineers 
designing impressive new machines and methods for construction and war-
  
 17 Id. at 1999. This would mean that by definition innovators are always creative, while creators 
might not always be innovative. 
 18 See, e.g., Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 156, 187 (1853) (Nelson, J., dissenting), rev’d 
in part, 63 U.S. (22 How.) 132 (1860).  
 19 See Sean M. O’Connor, The Lost “Art” of the Patent System, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. (forthcom-
ing June 2015) (manuscript at 5-6) (on file with the author). 
 20 Id. (manuscript at 14-15).  
 21 Id. (manuscript at 15-16). 
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fare in the early modern period. While Leonardo da Vinci is perhaps the 
most famous of these, there were a number of such inventive engineers 
offering their services to princes across Europe from the fourteenth century 
onward.22 In fact, the term “engineer” derived from “ingenere” and was 
related to “ingenious,” circling back again to the shared roots of “genie” 
and “genius.”23 This underscored the importance of “genius” inspiration for 
these new “engineers.” 
At the same time, equally prized in both artisans and engineers was the 
“skill” they had developed in producing artifacts or results in the real world. 
Much of this was in the form of the “show-how” variant of know-how that 
had to be mastered through practice.24 Show-how cannot be codified into 
text or images, although these mediums can be used to describe or help 
convey some of the actions involved. In modern cognitive science, show-
how is called “procedural knowledge” and is exemplified by learning to 
ride a bicycle or play guitar.25 Because artisanal show-how was also fre-
quently kept as trade secrets and demonstrated only to apprentices,26 its 
dissemination could be quite limited. Regions that did not possess show-
how actively sought it out, often through an early version of patents today 
referred to as “patents of importation.”27 
Innovation occurs when genius and skill come together and an unan-
ticipated new kind of artifact or method is developed. The idea of this new 
kind of thing arises through the inspirational sense of “genius,” but cannot 
be realized without the artisan’s show-how craft skill. The challenge is that 
not all inspired geniuses can master the requisite skill to bring their ideas to 
practical application, while many skilled artisans may have little inspira-
tion. Thus, those who possessed both were highly valued individuals.28 This 
carried through to the emerging class of engineers in the early modern peri-
od in which the number of inspired geniuses amongst those with technical 
skill was probably smaller than the number of geniuses in the creative artist 
classes.29 
  
 22 See id. (manuscript at 14-16).  
 23 Id. (manuscript at 14-15). 
 24 Id. (manuscript at 12-13).  
 25 See JOHN R. ANDERSON, THE ARCHITECTURE OF COGNITION, at viii, 215 (1983); see also 
ANNETTE KARMILOFF-SMITH, BEYOND MODULARITY: A DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVE ON 
COGNITIVE SCIENCE 16-17 (1992) (discussing playing the piano and solving the Rubik’s Cube as exam-
ples of procedural knowledge). Procedural knowledge is contrasted with “declarative knowledge” that is 
typified by declarative statements whose meanings are conveyed immediately upon comprehension by 
the recipient. For example, “Tom is ten years old” does not have to be practiced or mastered. 
 26 See O’Connor, supra note 19 (manuscript at 13). 
 27 Id. (manuscript at 2); cf. Ted Sichelman & Sean O’Connor, Patents as Promoters of Competi-
tion: The Guild Origins of Patent Law in the Venetian Republic, 49 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1267, 1268-69 
(2012). 
 28 See O’Connor, supra note 19 (manuscript at 15). 
 29 See id. (manuscript at 15-16). 
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Beyond the core point that neither artist:creator nor entrepre-
neur:innovator are co-extensive, artists still sometimes become entrepre-
neurs and vice versa, further blurring the categories. This is not a new phe-
nomenon. Samuel F.B. Morse was a visual artist who became fascinated 
with uses of the newly harnessed “galvanic” force and then developed an 
audiovisual system for communicating language at a distance through it, 
resulting in the telegraph.30 In the current era, this transition of artist to en-
trepreneur seems to have increased especially with regard to digital and 
social media start-ups.31 In a different vein are the actors, musicians, and 
other artists who build off their fame to launch entrepreneurial products or 
services.32 In the reverse, a number of entrepreneurs have become artists or 
focused on art-based products or services. One set of examples comes from 
the early decades of the music recording business in which entrepreneurs 
who sought to profit from selling records, such as the Chess brothers at 
Chess Records33 and Jim Stewart and Estelle Axton at Stax Records,34 dis-
covered major talents and helped develop new genres such as rock and roll, 
soul, and R&B. 
Increasingly there are “convergence” firms and fields that generate 
both creative content and innovative technology. Getty Images, for exam-
ple, not only developed an innovative technology platform for digitizing 
and distributing images, but it also now works directly with content creators 
to produce new works for Getty Image’s catalogues.35 Likewise, Netflix, 
which started as an Internet-based videos-by-mail service, moved into not 
only online streaming distribution, but also into the content production 
business with award-winning original programming including House of 
Cards and Orange Is the New Black.36 Both Getty and Netflix converged 
towards content production. But video game companies such as Valve 
  
 30 O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 68-69 (1854). 
 31 For example, the founders of Kickstarter are artists. Pressroom, KICKSTARTER, 
https://www.kickstarter.com/press (last visited Mar, 2, 2015).  
 32 Artist-celebrities such as Jennifer Lopez and Sean “P-Diddy” Combs have parlayed success as 
performers into multiple entrepreneurial product lines. Martin Bashir, Diddy Brings Same Old Hustle to 
Host of New Pursuits, ABC NEWS (June 10, 2010), http://abcnews.go.com/Nightline/diddy-exclusive-
nightline-interview/story?id=10866530; JENNIFER LOPEZ BEAUTY, http://www.jenniferlopezbeauty.com 
(last visited Mar, 2, 2015). 
 33 See Chess Records, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chess_Records (last modified Feb. 
19, 5:02 AM); Leonard Chess, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Leonard_Chess (last modified 
Jan. 11, 2015, 7:24 PM). 
 34 See Stax Records, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stax_Records (last modified Feb. 
05, 2015, 6:50 PM). 
 35 See About Us, GETTY IMAGES, http://press.gettyimages.com/about-us/ (last visited Mar. 2, 
2015).  
 36 Alex Ben Block, Netflix’s Ted Sarandos Explains Original Content Strategy, HOLLYWOOD 
REP. (Apr. 07, 2012, 11:26 AM), http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/news/netflix-ted-sarandos-
original-content-309275; Brian Stelter, Netflix’s Strategy: Shows for Every Age, CNN MONEY (Oct. 13, 
2014, 3:58 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2014/10/13/media/netflix-kids-interview/. 
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Software embodied the convergence of technology and content from the 
beginning.37 They produce both the creative content of their games as well 
as the technology behind them. Likewise, the path-breaking computer-
generated image movie company Pixar also engaged in this kind of conver-
gence from its founding.38 Pixar, in fact, has won both content and technol-
ogy awards.  
II. APPROPRIATION MECHANISMS 
Regardless of the actual distinction or overlap among artists, entrepre-
neurs, creators, and innovators, they all need some means of supporting 
both themselves and the practical instantiation of their ideas. This could be 
done through grants, awards, prizes, premiums, or other direct support to 
the individual. Or it could be done through monetization of the artifacts or 
services produced. In capitalist, market-based economies, the latter has 
been widely used. But for it to work, the artifacts or services must be ap-
propriable by the producer, otherwise no one will pay money for them. In 
other words, if others can simply take or reproduce the artifacts or services 
for free, then they will not pay the original producer. Appropriation mecha-
nisms thus allow for producers of artifacts or services to support them-
selves—and fund future productions—by being able to monetize those arti-
facts or services.39  
The concept of an appropriation mechanism can be illustrated by 
thinking about a craftsman who builds furniture. Personal property rights 
allow the craftsman to monetize the furniture he produces. For example, a 
particular chair he built is his exclusive property, assuming he had lawful 
unencumbered rights to the materials used to produce it and did not infringe 
anyone else’s rights in doing so. He can then seek to convey title in the 
chair to someone else in exchange for money or other value—in other 
words, sell the chair. The property right in the chair is the appropriation 
mechanism by which he can legally protect his investment and efforts in 
building the chair: no one else can simply take the chair without his permis-
sion, absent unusual legal circumstances. 
  
 37 Valve Software, producer of successful game franchises such as Half-Life, social-entertainment 
technology platform Steam, and game-engine developer tool Source, embodies this convergence. Wel-
come to Valve, VALVE, http://www.valvesoftware.com/company/index.html (last visited Mar. 2, 2015). 
In some ways, this echoes the early decades of the music recording industry in which pioneering pro-
ducer-engineers developed both content and technology to produce path-breaking multi-track audio 
landscapes that were nothing like what anyone had heard before on a regular soundstage. Dan Daley, 
The Engineers Who Changed Recording: Fathers of Invention, SOUND ON SOUND (Oct. 2004), 
http://www.soundonsound.com/sos/Oct04/articles/rocketscience.htm.  
 38 Our Story, PIXAR, http://www.pixar.com/about/Our-Story (last visited Mar. 2, 2015).  
 39 See David J. Teece, Profiting from Technological Innovation: Implications for Integration, 
Collaboration, Licensing and Public Policy, 15 RES. POL’Y 285, 287, 290 (1986). 
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IP rights are then the appropriation mechanisms for products of the in-
tellect.40 They allow one to control not just the artifacts or services one per-
sonally produces, but also any copies of those artifacts or services produced 
by others.41 The first kinds of IP rights to consider are patents that give ex-
clusive rights to inventors for novel and nonobvious useful products or 
methods.42 But this means that the inventor can effectively monetize not 
only his own direct production of goods or delivery of services, but also 
anyone else’s doing so. At the same time, the inventor and other producers 
of the covered goods will have personal property rights over the artifacts 
they produce themselves, just based on personal property rights as dis-
cussed above. Thus there seem to be two levels of appropriation mecha-
nisms covering the same productions. But the patent mechanism is not so 
much aimed at the actual physical goods as it is to the production of the 
innovation that the invention represents (and is then embodied in the 
goods). The four predominant economic justifications for patents are that 
they incentivize development of inventions, public disclosure of inventions 
(a condition of patenting), commercialization of inventions, and designing 
around currently patented inventions.43  
Trade secrets, while less property-like perhaps than patents, are also 
appropriation mechanisms that give legal redress to someone with confi-
dential, commercially valuable information or processes whose secrets have 
been misappropriated by someone else.44 Secrecy in and of itself can be an 
appropriation mechanism. But the law of trade secrets enhances the effec-
tiveness of secrecy as such a mechanism. Secrecy is further enhanced by 
the availability of enforceable contracts to allow limited disclosure to select 
others without the secret being deemed as now public.45 Additionally, legal 
steps taken to control the disclosure of secrets, such as nondisclosure con-
tracts, bolster one’s claim to having enforceable trade secrets.  
Copyright is another appropriation mechanism that gives exclusive 
rights to authors for copies of their original expressive works, including 
technology-oriented goods such as software.46 While the author has to have 
fixed the original expression in a tangible medium, once copyright arises 
the author can control the production of not only copies she produces, but 
also those that anyone else produces. And, again like patents, there are two 
levels of appropriation mechanisms at play for any copies. First is the per-
sonal property right to that physical object. Second is the copyright that is 
  
 40 Id. at 287 & fig. 3. 
 41 See id. at 290.  
 42 See id. at 287. 
 43 See F. SCOTT KIEFF ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 63-68 (6th 
ed. 2013). 
 44 See Teece, supra note 39, at 287. 
 45 See id. at 290.  
 46 See id. at 287, 290.  
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really directed at creation of the form and substance of the work, and not 
any particular copies. Further analogous to patents, copyrights are usually 
justified as incentivizing the creation of new, original works, the publica-
tion of such works (rather than keeping them private), and the distribution 
of copies of the work.47 
Trademarks are the last type of IP rights that can also be a valuable 
appropriation mechanism. In this case, the appropriated object is the brand 
of products or services as represented in particular words or images.48 De-
velopment of brands has become a core component to the commercializa-
tion of creative or innovative artifacts and methods.49 Trademarks are thus 
complementary to, and in some cases can be used as a partial substitute for, 
patents or copyrights. If consumers are inclined to buy products or services 
only from one company due to brand reputation and loyalty, then it may not 
matter so much if other companies can freely copy the original company’s 
products or services. 
Beyond the formal categories of IP rights lie some other legal tools 
that can be used as appropriation mechanisms. Rights of publicity under 
state law can allow for appropriation of one’s image and other indicia of 
personality as a kind of brand of the individual person.50 This is especially 
relevant for the monetization of goods or services that are provided directly 
by that person, or under their express endorsement or authorization. Like-
wise, Section 43 of the federal Lanham Act provides rights to any claims of 
endorsement or affiliation by individuals or legal persons, such as corpora-
tions.51  
All of these appropriation mechanisms arose to allow producers of 
creativity, innovation, goods, or services to monetize their productions. But 
because the revenues will not flow in until after the thing is produced and 
deployed, producers need to find some initial way to support themselves 
and the development necessary to engage in the commercialization process. 
No one would pay to support this engagement unless it was either clearly a 
charitable program, or unless there would eventually be a return on what is 
effectively an investment. Holding aside the charitable angle, then, it should 
be clear that no one would invest without some appropriation mechanism 
that would provide them with a favorable return on their investment 
through the monetization of the commercialized goods or services. If they 
cannot see a way to get such a return, they will not make the investment. 
While the linking of investment and appropriation mechanisms should 
be painfully self-evident, it can get lost in contemporary IP debates. This is 
  
 47 See ROBERT P. MERGES ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 
437 (6th ed. 2012). 
 48 Id. at 763-68. 
 49 See id. at 766-68.  
 50 Id. at 1064-65. 
 51 Id. at 943-52. 
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because researchers tend to only look at one mechanism at a time. When 
they then find an activity that does not rely on that mechanism, they are 
tempted to conclude that no appropriation mechanisms are needed.52 But 
this of course does not follow. For example, researchers looking at the fash-
ion industry and the stand-up comedy business argue that there is plenty of 
innovation in those fields even though copyright is not available for them.53 
But this ignores the powerful use of brands and trademarks in fashion, and 
glosses over the challenges and violence in the comedian business.54 
Thus, again, there have to be appropriation mechanisms for investors 
to get a return on their investment. Just because a field does not rely on the 
one mechanism someone might expect it to does not mean it uses none of 
the other mechanisms. The real question, then, is which mechanisms are 
being used in which fields? The next Part explores this core issue, with em-
phasis on the paradox that all producers want their inputs to be freely acces-
sible, while their outputs should be appropriable. 
III. INPUTS AND OUTPUTS 
All creators and innovators have both “inputs” and “outputs” with re-
gard to their products or services. In my experience as a transactional IP 
lawyer, I classify things like raw materials, processed materials, IP, other 
kinds of information, and even funding, as inputs. Naturally, each creator or 
innovator would like their inputs to be “free” in both senses of that term: 
“free” as in no cost, and “free” as in no permission or authorization re-
quired.55 At the same time, one would expect that most creators and innova-
tors would not like their outputs to be free simultaneously in both senses. 
For example, even those who might be happy to distribute their works at no 
cost generally want a right of attribution as well as the right to prevent uses 
of the work that they feel jeopardize its integrity.56 Given that in many cases 
  
 52 See, e.g., KAL RAUSTIALA & CHRISTOPHER SPRIGMAN, THE KNOCKOFF ECONOMY: HOW 
IMITATION SPARKS INNOVATION 7-8 (2012).  
 53 Id. 
 54 See Dotan Oliar & Cristopher Sprigman, There’s No Free Laugh (Anymore): The Emergence of 
Intellectual Property Norms and the Transformation of Stand-up Comedy, 94 VA. L. REV. 1787, 1790-
91 (2008); David M. Adler, Fashion Law: Protecting Brands and Designs, LANDSLIDE, Jan./Feb. 2013, 
at 21, 21-23 (2013).  
 55 The open source and free software community traditionally illustrated this as the distinction 
between “free beer” and “free speech.” What Is Free Software?, GNU OPERATING SYS., 
http://www.gnu.org/philosophy/free-sw.html (last updated Aug. 5, 2014). 
 56 Integrity has multiple senses as well. One sense is where others modify the work in ways that 
the author or inventor feels changes the meaning or renders it less effective in its practical use, yet still 
presents it as the author’s or inventor’s work, respectively. Another sense is context including the ap-
pearance of affiliation or endorsement, such as where others use the author’s work as part of a political 
campaign for a candidate diametrically opposed to the author’s own political views. There may be less 
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one creator’s or innovator’s output is another’s input, tensions arise as to 
how appropriation mechanisms can be used by creators and innovators to 
potentially control or affect “downstream” creativity or innovation.  
Traditionally, this tension has been viewed in an upstream/downstream 
construct within either the “creative” fields or the “innovation” fields.57 In 
other words, artists’ use of other artists’ works or inventors’ use of other 
inventors’ inventions. But this Essay posits that the real issue is the use of 
creators’ works as a kind of commodity or throughput product of innova-
tors’ new search58 and social media platforms. As part of the process, users 
of the search or social media platforms may use or modify the original crea-
tors’ works, but such use or modification is not being done by the search or 
social media platforms. Because the platforms largely monetize their tech-
nology innovations through advertising models, they would, not surprising-
ly, like content creators to exercise minimal appropriation rights so that 
maximal content is freely available (in both senses of the word “free”) 
through the platforms.59 Content creators, by contrast, of course would gen-
erally like some level of appropriability of their works—if for nothing else 
other than to ensure proper attribution.60 
This Part proceeds by first examining the background of the “remix” 
user-generated-content (“UGC”) culture in appropriation art and music 
sampling. It then briefly discusses how the UGC culture emerged in its pre-
sent form through social media platforms. Next, this Part considers the re-
  
of an interest in this sense for inventors with regard to their inventions (although they likely have these 
interests with regard to their persona). 
 57 See, e.g., Joseph P. Fishman, Creating Around Copyright, 128 HARV. L. REV. (forthcoming 
2015) (manuscript at 2-3), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2465590##; 
Alberto Galasso & Mark Schankerman, Patents and Cumulative Innovation: Causal Evidence from the 
Courts 2, 6-10 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper No. 20269, 2014), available at 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w20269.pdf.  
 58 “Search” is used here in its information technology meaning as digital Internet search engines 
such as Google. See JACQUES BUGHIN ET AL., THE IMPACT OF INTERNET TECHNOLOGIES: SEARCH 1 
(2011); SEARCH ENGINE HIST., http://www.searchenginehistory.com (last visited Mar. 2, 2015). 
 59 See, e.g., BUGHIN ET AL., supra note 58, at 22-27; JEANETTE CARLSSON, AN ASSESSMENT OF 
SOCIAL MEDIA BUSINESS MODELS AND STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE IMPLEMENTATION 28 
(2010), available at http://www.opengardensblog.futuretext.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/10/Jeanette-
Carlsson-An-Assessment-of-Social-Media-Models.pdf; ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., 
OECD INTERNET ECONOMY OUTLOOK 2012, at 184-87 (2012); Eric Fulwiler, As Pinterest Meets With 
Marketers, Evolving Business Model Gets Clearer: Pinterest Isn’t About Social, It’s About the Visual 
Web and Search, ADVERTISING AGE (May 24, 2013), http://adage.com/article/digitalnext/pinterest-
social-search/241683/. Some social media platforms have attempted to bring at least users into ad reve-
nue sharing programs, although even these still do not address the third party creators whose works may 
be used by the platforms’ users as inputs into the latter’s user-generated content. See, e.g., Mike 
O’Brien, Are Paid Platforms the Future of Social?, CLICKZ (Oct. 27, 2014), http://www.
clickz.com/clickz/news/2377732/are-paid-platforms-the-future-of-social. 
 60 See Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, The Attribution Right in the United States: Caught in the Cross-
fire Between Copyright and Section 43(A), 77 WASH. L. REV. 985, 985-87 (2002). 
2015] CREATORS, INNOVATORS & APPROPRIATION 985 
lated but different dynamics of search and the access-to-knowledge 
(“A2K”) movement. Finally, it presents a core theme of this Essay that at 
least some major search and social media firms are trying to undermine 
creator attribution mechanisms while downplaying their support for and 
enforcement of their own attribution mechanisms. 
A. Setting the Stage for the “Remix” Culture: Appropriation Art 
The seminal copyright parody fair use case Campbell v. Acuff-Rose 
Music, Inc.61 helped establish Judge Pierre Leval’s concept of “transforma-
tive use” into the case law.62 Section 107 in the Copyright Act sets out four 
factors courts must consider when deciding whether the copying of a regis-
tered work is actionable infringement:  
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial na-
ture or is for nonprofit educational purposes; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the 
amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; 
and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.63  
Campbell concerned a fair use defense raised by the rap group 2 Live 
Crew for copying the hit song “Oh, Pretty Woman” by Roy Orbison.64 
While 2 Live Crew’s version was clearly commercial, as was the original, 
and a substantial portion of the original was used by the rap group, the 
Court found that 2 Live Crew had “transformed” the original through what 
the rap group claimed was an attempt at parody, such that the new work did 
not have much of a detrimental effect on the market for the original.65 Ac-
cordingly, the group was not liable for infringement.66 
Subsequent to this case, the judicial factor of “transformative use” has 
expanded far beyond both the category of music copyright and the fair use 
parody defense. It is routinely invoked for almost any copyright infringe-
ment claim where it is fairly clear that copying has occurred.67 If the alleged 
infringer can create any argument that he has transformed the copied ele-
ments from either their original form or by placing them into a new context, 
  
 61 510 U.S. 569 (1994). 
 62 Id. at 579, 589, 584; Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 
1110-12 (1990). 
 63 Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012). 
 64 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 571-72. 
 65 Id. at 578-85. 
 66 Id. at 594. 
 67 See The Scope of Fair Use: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Prop., and 
the Internet of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 13-14, 17-18 (2014) (statement of June M. 
Besek, Executive Director of Kernochan Center for Law, Media and the Arts, and Lecturer-in-Law, 
Columbia Law School).  
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then he might be judged to have engaged in permissible activity.68 Fair use 
is designed to be one of the Copyright Act’s “safety valves” or “built-in 
First Amendment accommodations” that balances the exclusive rights of 
authors with important public interest speech and A2K values.69 For exam-
ple, commentators must be able to not only reference works they wish to 
critique, but they also should be able to reproduce short segments for illus-
trative purposes.70 Likewise, classroom instructors must be able to use seg-
ments of works they are discussing in class.71  
Around the same time as Judge Leval was articulating transformative 
use and the Supreme Court was applying it in Campbell, the emerging doc-
trine was put to the test in copyright litigation over “appropriation art.” In 
this art form, artists take the existing work of others as a kind of “found art” 
input that they then modify or incorporate into a new work.72 In an early test 
case, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit found appropriation 
artist Jeff Koons liable for infringement of the plaintiff photographer’s pho-
to “Puppies.”73 Koons conceded that his sculpture “String of Puppies” was a 
copy of the photo, but claimed that it was a fair use because it was intended 
as parody or commentary.74 The court was not persuaded, and the case 
raised the question of whether an artist can simply claim that he intended to 
parody or comment on the original work, or whether there has to be some 
objective evidence that the audience for the work would perceive it as 
such.75  
But the Second Circuit appears to have warmed to the idea of appro-
priation art as a transformative fair use in recent years. In a 2006 decision 
also involving Koons’s work, the court found his collage artwork “Niaga-
ra”—which included an unauthorized copy of plaintiff photographer’s im-
age of sandal-clad feet from a Gucci ad—to be a “transformative” fair use 
that would be unlikely to have an effect on the market for the original 
work.76 In its most recent statement on the matter, the Second Circuit held 
  
 68 Id. at 13-18. 
 69 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003).  
 70 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012).  
 71 Id.  
 72 See ROBERT ATKINS, ARTSPEAK: A GUIDE TO CONTEMPORARY IDEAS, MOVEMENTS, AND 
BUZZWORDS, 1945 TO THE PRESENT 69-70 (David Fabricant ed., 3d ed. 2013).  
 73 Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 313 (2d Cir. 1992). 
 74 Id. at 308.  
 75 Id. at 310. These types of cases can also raise the further question whether the artist truly in-
tended the work to be a parody or commentary on the original at the time of creation or whether such 
claims are simply developed later as a defense strategy. 
 76 Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 258-59 (2d Cir 2006) (finding the same appropriation artist’s, 
(Jeff Koons’s) use of “Silk Sandals” as fair use and not an infringement). 
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that a work could be transformative even if it were not a parody or com-
mentary on the work.77  
Koons is reputedly about to be sued for copyright infringement yet 
again.78 But even as he repeatedly seems to play fast and loose with others’ 
copyrighted works as merely his inputs, he paradoxically is vigorous to 
enforce his own copyrights.79 This underscores the hubris of some creative 
innovators: their contributions are valuable; everyone else’s not so much. 
B. The Emergence of Social Media Platforms and User-Generated 
Content 
When inexpensive digital image processing tools became available in 
recent years, they fueled the use of social media platforms such as Face-
book, YouTube, Instagram, and Pinterest for posting of UGC. This comes 
in three categories, as articulated by Professor Daniel Gervais.80 “User-
authored content” consists of content created entirely by users.81 “User-
derived content” consists of content that is created by substantially modify-
ing third-party content.82 “User-copied content” consists of third-party con-
tent simply reposted by users to their own platforms.83 The most concerning 
categories are user-derived and user-copied, as they involve the works of 
others. In the analog print world, such uses by amateurs may not have 
raised as many copyright issues because dissemination was limited.84 But 
the online digital world of social media changed all this, as the works can 
now be distributed around the world with the click of a mouse.  
  
 77 See Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 707 (2d Cir. 2013). The Second Circuit reversed a district 
court injunction against appropriation artist Richard Prince for his use of photographer Patrick Cariou’s 
published photos. Id. at 712. The district court had found that Prince’s work did not parody or comment 
directly on Cariou’s work, and that Cariou lost at least one potential gallery show because of Prince’s 
high profile gallery showing of the appropriated works. Id. at 707-08. But the Second Circuit held that 
this application of the fair use factors was too narrow and that twenty-five of the thirty unauthorized 
uses were fair, remanding to the district court to review the remaining five under the clarified fair use 
factors. Id. at 712. The case was settled before the remand was decided. See Brian Boucher, Landmark 
Copyright Lawsuit Cariou v. Prince Is Settled, ART IN AM. (Mar. 18, 2014), 
http://www.artinamericamagazine.com/news-features/news/landmark-copyright-lawsuit-cariou-v-
prince-is-settled/. 
 78 See Doreen Carvajal, Koons Again Accused of Copyright Infringement, N.Y. TIMES ARTSBEAT 
BLOG (Dec. 19, 2014, 2:26 PM), http://artsbeat.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/12/19/koons-again-accused-of-
copyright-infringement/?_r=1.  
 79 Id. 
 80 Daniel Gervais, The Tangled Web of UGC: Making Copyright Sense of User-Generated Con-
tent, 11 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 841, 858-59 (2009).  
 81 Id. at 858.  
 82 Id. at 869.  
 83 Id. at 859.  
 84 Id. at 870.  
988 GEO. MASON L. REV. [VOL. 22:4 
With regard to user-derived and user-copied content, the question is 
whether and when postings that include other creators’ content should qual-
ify as transformative use. Nothing about the Internet changes the basic rela-
tionship between copyright and free speech as established in the physical 
world.85 Thus, case law around things such as appropriation art should still 
be used as reliable indicators for the resolution of fair use questions in digi-
tal and social media. Here the focus is on “mash-ups,” “remixes,” or even 
simply audio or visual content that happens to include someone else’s work 
(such as the infamous “dancing baby” video with a baby dancing along to a 
Prince song).86 Are these transformative in the sense of fair use, or are they 
instead simply derivative works that are intentionally based on, and benefit-
ting from, the copied work and which need to be licensed from the copied 
work’s copyright owner?87 
This is a difficult question and well beyond the scope of this Essay, 
but the answer cannot be that all uses of other’s content are transformative 
just because the user is copying the content for his own purposes. For ex-
ample, adding some video to a recording of one’s favorite song is likely not 
transformative, even though it feels like the video helps others understand 
how the song affects you. Likewise, the fact that one is not making money 
off one’s postings—and not attempting to—is not dispositive for fair use 
either. The Internet does change one part of the fair use dynamic: even if 
one is truly posting one’s video-enhanced copy of someone else’s song for 
one’s circle of friends, unless the video is password protected or otherwise 
restricted, it is now available to the world and can significantly diminish the 
market for the song. At the same time, the ease with which digital content 
can be manipulated allows for unparalleled possibilities for fair use com-
mentary and parody. The difficult zone is the “other” categories of trans-
formative use that are neither commentary nor parody, alluded to by the 
Second Circuit.88 
  
 85 See Sean M. O’Connor, The Internet Does Not Reset the Copyright-Free Speech Balance, 
GEORGE MASON UNIV. SCH. L.: CTR. FOR PROT. INTELL. PROP, Nov. 2013, at 1, 1, available at 
http://cpip.gmu.edu/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/The-Internet-Does-Not-Reset-the-Copyright-Free-
Speech-Balance.pdf.  
 86 See Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., 572 F.Supp.2d 1150, 1151-52 (N.D. Cal. 2008). 
 87 “A ‘derivative work’ is a work based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a translation, 
musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture version, sound recording, art repro-
duction, abridgment, condensation, or any other form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or 
adapted. A work consisting of editorial revisions, annotations, elaborations, or other modifications 
which, as a whole, represent an original work of authorship, is a ‘derivative work.’” 17 U.S.C. § 101 
(2012). The preparation of derivative works is one of the express exclusive rights of copyright owners. 
Id. § 106. It is a highly valuable right probably best known to the general public through references in 
popular media to book authors’ “motion picture rights.” While there is a compulsory license for new 
“covers” of musical compositions that have already been released on phonorecords under direct authori-
zation from the copyright owner, this only extends to new audio recordings, and not to audiovisual 
recordings (even where the video portion is simply the musicians performing the song). Id. § 115(a)(2). 
 88 See Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 707 (2d Cir. 2013).  
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For some, this situation is not concerning: user-derived content and 
user-copied content should be seen as at least transformative fair use, if not 
an indictment of the allegedly outdated legal artifact of copyright law.89 
Further, those who view the demise of copyright as of no particular concern 
believe that creators who have other jobs or ways of making money will 
produce adequate creative works.90 In other words, we should not worry 
about whether users post their own content or that of others because copy-
right is an outmoded means of economic regulation in cyberspace: we 
should simply allow users to post freely without regard to obtaining permis-
sions from others or compensating other creators for the latter’s work. 
A related strand of this thinking is that the new digital tools for pro-
duction and distribution of content have reduced production costs to effec-
tively zero.91 For example, anyone with a Mac computer and an Internet 
connection can use the GarageBand application to record a song and make 
it instantly available to the world. Or, even more basic, anyone can use the 
built-in camera and microphone on her computer to record herself perform-
ing songs that can then be posted to YouTube for worldwide distribution. If 
the clips are good enough, or quirky enough, they will go viral and voila: 
recording studios, producers, side musicians, managers, record labels, rec-
ord pressing plants, record sleeve artists/designers, marketers, distributors, 
and record stores have been rendered obsolete. 
Except that we do not actually seem to want a world with only what 
this Essay will call “amateur song selfies”—no matter how cute they might 
be on occasion or how often they introduce a new talent. Instead, as shown 
in one of the most famous cases of this phenomenon, the singer in question 
did not stop once achieving success with his amateur song selfies. Justin 
Bieber followed up his YouTube fame by signing with a label and a man-
ager that put him into a professional studio with professional producers, and 
recorded highly produced pop music.92 
Thus the issue is not whether people will create new songs and other 
content without appropriation mechanisms such as copyright, but whether 
  
 89 See LAWRENCE LESSIG, REMIX: MAKING ART AND COMMERCE THRIVE IN THE HYBRID 
ECONOMY 272-73 (2008). 
 90 See id. at 157; RAUSTIALA & SPRIGMAN, supra note 52, at 7-8. 
 91 See, e.g., Raymond Shih Ray Ku, The Creative Destruction of Copyright: Napster and the New 
Economics of Digital Technology, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 263, 305-06 (2002). For a critique of these as-
sumptions, see Adam Mossoff, How Copyright Drives Innovation in Scholarly Publishing 15 (George 
Mason Univ. Law & Econ. Research Paper Series No. 13-25, 2013), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2243264.  
 92 Bieber’s manager Scooter Braun did keep the artist producing YouTube videos made to look 
amateur for a while after signing him to “build him up more” with his Internet fan base. But the intent 
was never to let Bieber remain on YouTube in this format forever. Rather it was a calculated marketing 
move to build a kind of Internet street cred that could then be translated into major revenues for profes-
sional recordings and live performances. Jan Hoffman, Justin Bieber Is Living the Dream, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 3, 2010, at ST1.  
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they can produce them to the degree we (and they) would like. Quality pro-
duction takes a lot more than a laptop and the free software that comes 
loaded on it.93 Even where that equipment could be adequate, it is the train-
ing of the person using it in the production of recorded content that makes it 
good, not just ideas for the content generally.94 One person can certainly do 
it all, but it takes significant experience and talent to perform all those func-
tions. 
Professor Rob Merges argues that policymakers should fight against 
the demise of IP in this way because they should support a professional 
creative class of artists and inventors.95 But he does not satisfactorily ex-
plain why this is important. Primarily he seems to root it in human dignity 
and valuing artists and inventors as deserving the support of what he seems 
to concede is a utilitarian market intervention by IP systems.96 He also 
adopts the position that we will get “better” art and inventions if society 
supports a creative class, but does not exactly articulate why.97 
There is, however, a direct and pragmatic argument for the value of a 
full-time creative class: maintaining and being at the top of one’s craft re-
quires daily practice. It is not about tying it to any particular kinds of indi-
viduals, expressions, or inventions. Rather, it is about ensuring that those 
whose works seem to be appreciated by others can make the best possible 
versions of those works. The importance of daily engagement in one’s craft 
is well represented by performing artists such as musicians, who refer to the 
phenomenon as “chops.” To “keep his chops up,” the musician must con-
stantly practice. When in this state, the musician can execute difficult pas-
sages to the very best of his ability. When he has not played for a while, he 
can still play well, but he cannot match his best playing and intensity. This 
can apply to any craft or skilled activity. Would you rather undergo brain 
surgery from the doctor who is currently performing these operations on a 
regular basis or one who has not picked up a scalpel in a few years? Ena-
bling a mechanism so that creators and inventors can get paid for engaging 
in creation/invention means that they can do it more frequently—without 
the distractions of having to make money doing something else—which in 
turn increases the chances they will produce their best work. To be clear, 
this is not about “high art” versus “low art.” It is about the artist having the 
  
 93 The equivalent of this in scholarly publishing has been well documented by Adam Mossoff. 
Mossoff, supra note 91, at 15. 
 94 See, e.g., Tim Chester, 50 of the Greatest Producers Ever, NME, http://www.nme.com/list/50-
of-the-greatest-producers-ever/262849/article/265277#article (last visited Mar. 2, 2015); Daley, supra 
note 37. 
 95 See ROBERT P. MERGES, JUSTIFYING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, at xi-xii (2011). The creative 
class concept largely originated with Richard Florida. RICHARD FLORIDA, THE RISE OF THE CREATIVE 
CLASS: AND HOW IT’S TRANSFORMING WORK, LEISURE, COMMUNITY, AND EVERYDAY LIFE, at ix 
(2002). 
 96 MERGES, supra note 95, at xi-xii. 
 97 Id. at 2.  
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time and tools to perfect whatever kind of creative expression she envi-
sions. 
The further challenge to those who support what this Essay will call 
the “content wants to be free” approach is that the social media platforms 
are themselves monetizing the content through advertising and data min-
ing.98 Thus, it seems inequitable at best for the platforms and their support-
ers to be advocating a culture of “free” when the platforms are making 
money off that content (and the users’ information on top of it through the 
sale of the data generated about such users). This angle will be explored 
further in Part III.D below. 
C. Search Engines and Access to Knowledge Movement: Content as 
Commodity or Commons 
A different debate is over the importance of ensuring that those of lim-
ited means or in countries with limited infrastructure can have adequate 
A2K in the form of online content.99 In this debate, two conflicting moral 
claims must be balanced against each other: the right of creators to exert 
some control over their creations, and the public interest in not having im-
portant knowledge restricted only to the privileged few who can afford it. 
Further, the A2K movement champions the view that some areas of 
knowledge should be viewed as the common heritage of humanity and ac-
cessible to all. Search engines such as Google, through its Google Books 
project, ally themselves with the A2K movement—perhaps in part to share 
in the progressive moral high ground that A2K seems to occupy.100 
But even though both search firms and A2K claim to start from the po-
sitions that authors should get paid for their work and that copyright should 
be respected, they seem to favor free access as a trump card over such prin-
ciples. Content is merely the commodity or commons that gets moved 
through the technical infrastructure for mass distribution and repurposing—
preferably as freely as possible. While search firms and A2K do not explain 
how creators are supposed to support themselves, one gets the sense that 
they believe that creators will simply find salaried positions or government 
support. However, this really only works on the government support side 
(through salaries, grants, contracts, prizes, etc.) because salaries or support 
on the private side only push the problem back to the employer. If the em-
  
 98 See O’Brien, supra note 59. 
 99 See, e.g., ACCESS TO KNOWLEDGE, http://a2knetwork.org/a2k (last visited Feb. 17, 2015). 
 100 See, e.g., Competition that Works: Why Google Books Project Is Good for Consumers and 
Competitors: Hearing on Competition and Commerce in Digital Books Before the H. Judiciary Comm. 
111th Cong. 1 (2009) (statement of David A. Balto, Senior Fellow, Center for American Progress Ac-
tion Fund). 
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ployer cannot monetize the works either, then how can it afford to continue 
paying creators or inventors?101 
Like social media platforms, search firms are now monetizing UGC in 
a way that seems inequitable to both users and third-party creators whose 
works are copied or co-opted by users’ postings. In some cases, the moneti-
zation is tied directly to pirate sites.102 Thus, a search firm’s rhetorical adop-
tion of A2K ethics and moral high ground should be undermined by its re-
lentless—and highly profitable—monetization of its users’ “free” searches. 
Search firms are not a charitable venture. Rather, the model of free searches 
available to everyone with an Internet connection is instead a business 
model that became highly profitable for firms like Google only because 
sophisticated data tracking and mining was also developed by the firms to 
maximize advertising and marketing revenues. This puts search firms in 
effectively the same position as “free” social media platforms that effective-
ly lure users in to reveal a treasure trove of personal preferences and habits 
that can be packaged and sold to big businesses (and others) hungry for 
such data.103 But, as discussed in Part III.D below, the protection of these 
algorithms by search firms and social media firms through multiple modes 
of appropriation mechanisms is also central to their business models, as it 
gives them a crucial advantage over competitors whose algorithms are not 
as effective. If these competitors could simply copy and infringe the algo-
rithms of dominant players such as Google, the search and social media 
landscape would likely look much different.  
D. Search and Social Media Shell Game: Undermining Creator 
Appropriation Mechanisms While Quietly Protecting and Enforcing 
Innovator Appropriation Mechanisms 
The business models of Google/YouTube, Facebook, Pinterest, Insta-
gram, and other search firms and social media platforms rely on content as 
a mere “commodity” that is sent through the systems by users as fuel for 
  
 101 Of course, the more concerning speculation is that search and A2K proponents simply believe 
that creators can, or should, get day jobs working in some other industry to support their creative work 
(which will then be done perpetually after hours and on weekends). 
 102 See Chris Castle, Google May Continue Driving Traffic to Pirate Sites After DMCA Notices by 
Using Its Google Alerts Product, MUSIC!TECH.!POL’Y (Jan. 7, 2015) https://musictechpolicy.
wordpress.com/2015/01/07/google-may-continue-driving-traffic-to-pirate-sites-after-dmca-notices-by-
using-its-google-alerts-product/.  
 103 Satirical fake news outfit The Onion provides a hilarious, yet deeply disturbing, send-up of the 
data mining and profiling activities of both Facebook and Google. See CIA’s Facebook Program Dra-
matically Cut Agency’s Costs, ONION, http://www.theonion.com/video/cias-facebook-program-
dramatically-cut-agencys-cos,19753/ (last visited Feb. 17, 2015); Google Opt Out Feature Lets Users 
Protect Privacy by Moving to Remote Village, ONION, http://www.theonion.com/video/google-opt-out-
feature-lets-users-protect-privacy,14358/ (last visited Feb. 17, 2015). 
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this community of users to engage with the platforms in ever-increasing 
amounts.104 Because the business models are largely ad-based and depend 
on data mining for revenue, the number one imperative for the platforms is 
to maximize the number of users and click-throughs.105 Many of the systems 
have also explored “freemium” business models in which a free version of 
the system is offered to lure in users, who will hopefully then convert to the 
paid subscription version with more features.106 However, the freemium 
models can be difficult to deploy.107 The only revenue models that value 
content in and of itself are those that allow copyright owners to monetize 
the content by adding links to products related to the content, or even to 
sites where those accessing the content can download a legal copy.108 But 
these models do not produce revenue for the search firm or social media 
firm; they only appease some content owners who can make effective use 
of them. Thus, the search firm or social media firm must still produce reve-
nues through advertising, data mining, or subscription models. Thus, when 
considering all the business and revenue models, none give the search or 
social media platform firms any incentive to protect user or third-party 
creator content, other than legal compliance. 
Yet even compliance with copyright law does not necessarily provide 
a strong incentive for search and social media firms to protect user or third-
party creator content. In fact, the Digital Millennium Copyright Act 
(“DMCA”) unintentionally created a disincentive for search engine and 
social media platforms to participate vigorously in protecting the rights of 
creators.109 Entrepreneurs starting search engine or social media platforms 
that will include UGC are generally told two things by attorneys: (1) put 
strong terms of service agreements and the “DMCA Page” on the web-
site;110 and (2) do not monitor UGC.111 Once the site is live, its operators 
  
 104 See CARLSSON, supra note 59, at 20-24. 
 105 Id. 
 106 Id. at 26. 
 107 See Vineet Kumar, Making “Freemium” Work, HARV. BUS. REV., May 2014, available at 
https://hbr.org/2014/05/making-freemium-work.  
 108 YouTube’s Content ID is one such program. See How Content ID Works, GOOGLE 
https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/2797370?hl=en (last visited Mar. 2, 2015). However, sites 
using this revenue model must be careful that if they wind up monetizing content posted by users that 
turns out to be infringing, they may lose their safe harbor for secondary liability for that infringement 
under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act discussed in the next paragraph. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(B) 
(2012) (for sites hosting content); id. § 512(d)(2) (for search engines). 
 109 The DMCA was enacted in 1998 to set the ground rules for copyright law in the emerging 
digital era. Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998).  
 110 The DMCA Page is what lawyers call the mandatory disclosure under the DMCA of the web-
site’s registered agent for purposes of receiving and acting on takedown notices sent by copyright own-
ers regarding infringing content on the site. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(2). Such agents must also be registered 
with the Copyright Office. Id. Complying with these items enables the website to come under the 
DMCA’s safe harbor for “online service providers.” 
 111 The exception is for offensive or obscene material (unless of course that is the point of the site). 
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must remove or block content flagged as infringing if a “takedown notice” 
is submitted to the site’s registered agent.112 But this is reactive, not proac-
tive, on the part of the website. Complying with the DMCA notice and 
takedown provisions provides the website, as an “online service provider” 
(“OSP”) under the statute, with safe harbor protection from secondary lia-
bility for the infringing content.113 
Those who know the details of the statute may find the “do not moni-
tor” piece of advice curious. There is nothing in the law that prevents a 
UGC-hosting social media platform OSP from monitoring content for copy-
right infringement. But there is no benefit for the social media platform to 
do so: it gets the safe harbor regardless. At the same time, there are some 
serious potential downsides. First, there are the costs in resources. But even 
worse, given the “red flag” provisions under the statute, a social media plat-
form that does monitor may well find itself with actual knowledge of in-
fringement or an awareness of facts or circumstances from which infringing 
activity is apparent.114 At that point, the platform must expeditiously remove 
or disable access to the relevant infringing material, or else lose the safe 
harbor.115 It must also do so without having received a takedown notice.116 
Thus, the advice is “don’t monitor.” 
The analysis and advice for search OSPs is similar. However, search 
platforms that merely provide links or references to other websites via in-
formation location tools are not required to have a registered agent.117 But 
the safe harbor is still dependent on them expeditiously responding to 
takedown notices (in this case to take down or disable links to the infring-
ing content hosted on the linked site) and removing or disabling access to 
any links for which it has actual knowledge, or from the facts and circum-
stances should be aware, of infringing materials at the linked site.118 There 
is no upside to monitoring, and only downsides. So the DMCA makes it 
more advantageous to not monitor and simply wait for takedown notices. 
At the same time, search firms and social media platforms that want to 
do the right thing fear the “chump” factor. If everyone else is playing fast 
and loose with copyright—and making money or getting attention for doing 
so—why should they walk the straight and narrow path (losing “eyeballs” 
and money along the way)? Further, in an environment glamorizing “pira-
  
 112 17 U.S.C. § 512(c). 
 113 Id. § 512(g). 
 114 Id. § 512(c)(1)(A)(i) (stating that a OSP will not be held liable for infringement if the OSP 
“does not have actual knowledge that material . . . is infringing”). 
 115 Id. § 512(c)(1)(C).  
 116 See id. § 512(c)(1)(A). 
 117 See id. § 512(d). 
 118 17 U.S.C. § 512(d)(3). 
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cy” and adhering to the “culture of free,”119 the copyright-compliant website 
might look decidedly uncool. 
Perhaps the most troubling aspect of many search firms and social me-
dia platforms is that they appear to value their own contributions—the 
computer code and business model—over the vast amounts of other peo-
ple’s content that effectively power use of their systems. Taking on the 
mantle of “innovation,” they seem to view their new distribution platforms 
as more important than the very thing the platforms are ostensibly supposed 
to promote: creative expression. If this were merely a superiority attitude it 
would not matter much. But a pernicious side effect is that many search 
firms and social media platforms seem quite willing to denigrate, or at least 
be deeply ambivalent towards, the validity of copyright enforcement for 
copyright owners whose materials are arguably infringed on the sites. This 
makes sense as it is in their interest. Too much enforcement of copyright—
regardless of whether it is legitimate—might mean less use of the site, 
which in turn means lower revenues. 
This goes to the central theme of this Essay: some innovators are eco-
nomically benefitting from their own IP-protected services by monetizing 
these services through a model that undermines creators’ IP. In other words, 
when Google, for example, uses its advanced algorithms to profit from ad-
vertising and data mining tied to links to pirate sites or copyright-infringing 
content on its subsidiary, YouTube, it is very much relying on its patents, 
trade secret, copyright, and contract protections on these algorithms so that 
other search and social media firms cannot simply duplicate this code. A 
world in which innovators’ code was seriously threatened by misappropria-
tion and piracy would likely see search firms and social media firms public-
ly calling for stronger enforcement of their chosen appropriation mecha-
nisms. For example, it is telling that Google has not chosen to make its core 
search and analytics code open source, despite its stated “long-term inter-
ests in open source.”120 In fact, the company clearly states its proprietary 
intentions and use of multiple appropriation mechanisms (e.g., IP, confiden-
tiality, and contracts) to advance its business model in its formal filings 
with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission.121 Underscoring its 
  
 119 See, e.g., Clyde Haberman, Grappling with the “Culture of Free” in Napster’s Aftermath, N.Y. 
TIMES (Dec. 7, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/08/technology/grappling-with-the-culture-of-
free-in-napsters-aftermath.html. This is in many ways an updated version of the “information wants to 
be free” ethic. 
 120 See Google Inc., Annual Report 13 (Form 10-K), SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION (Feb. 12, 
2014), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1288776/000128877614000020/goog2013123110-
k.htm [hereinafter Google Inc.].  
 121 Id. 
996 GEO. MASON L. REV. [VOL. 22:4 
commitment to a proprietary model, Google is now number eight on the list 
of firms securing the most U.S. patents.122 
Thus, it is relatively easy for tech “innovator” firms to undermine the 
copyright that protects creators’ content because tech firms by and large use 
different appropriation mechanisms. Their code and business models are 
often protected by a combination of patents, trade secrets, and contracts (in 
the form of the enforceable terms of service that restrict what users can do 
with the site, its content, and any accessible code behind it, as well as con-
fidentiality and IP assignment agreements with employees and independent 
contractors).123 And while copyright is also usually part of that mix, it is 
only one part and the subject matter is computer code—not images, music, 
text, or video. Thus, in a kind of shell game, the tech firms can freely advo-
cate for copyright reform that would weaken copyright enforcement for 
content owners without much risk that any changes would hurt their own 
appropriation mechanisms. In other words, even if their copyright reform 
efforts resulted in weaker copyright protection for their own code, they 
would still have patents, trade secrets, and contractual restrictions. But con-
tent creators really only have copyright to protect their works.  
However, the apparent marginalization of content as mere commodity 
or commons by tech innovator firms could just as easily be turned around in 
theory by content producers: applications (“apps”) are the mere “widgets” 
that allow distribution of premium content. Even during parts of the digital 
era so far, “content is king.” It could become so again. In fact, given the 
proliferation of app developers and resultant apps, they could become a 
“dime a dozen” and be even more abundant than UGC. Further, despite the 
rise of reality television and other relatively cheap, unscripted shows, that 
trend seems to have peaked and receded in the face of a “second golden 
age” of television being produced by premium cable channels, broadcast 
television, and distribution-platforms-turned-content-producers such as 
Netflix.124 
CONCLUSION 
Tech innovators currently appear to have the upper hand in protecting 
their appropriation mechanisms and leveraging business models that un-
dermine the appropriation mechanisms of creators. But this was not always 
  
 122 See Don Clark, IBM Wins Most Patents—Again—but Google and Apple Climb in Rankings, 
WALL ST. J.: DIGITS (Jan. 12, 2015. 9:00 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2015/01/12/ibm-wins-most-
patents-again-but-google-apple-climb-in-rankings/.  
 123 See, e.g., Google Inc., supra note 120, at 13. 
 124 See, e.g., David Carr, Barely Keeping Up in TV’s New Golden Age, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2014, 
at B1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/10/business/media/fenced-in-by-televisions-
excess-of-excellence.html. 
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the case, and may not remain the situation for very long. In any event, the 
“creators vs. innovators” construct is an increasingly skewed and inaccurate 
picture of the digital realm. Instead, returning to where this Essay started, 
innovators are creators and creators are innovators. Pixar, Getty Images, 
Valve Software, and many other “convergence” industry firms create new 
technology and content. Netflix and YouTube now produce both distribu-
tion platforms and content.  
Despite the apparent interest of some deep-pocketed concerns to force 
the false innovator-creator dichotomy to advance their own interests (i.e., 
limiting their costs of doing business by running roughshod over content 
copyrights), the dichotomy is just that—false—and deeply corrosive to the 
kind of constructive dialogue over IP rights and other appropriation mecha-
nisms that are necessary in our digital age society. Further, the insinuated 
geography of it—Northern California tech titans versus Southern California 
entertainment behemoths—is also inaccurate and unnecessarily divisive. 
The rhetoric on the tech side seems to also paint this as a battle of the future 
versus the past, with tech on the right side of history, and the entertainment 
companies playing the role of hidebound naysayers holding back progress. 
But this again is simply false, as illustrated by the technology-pioneering 
status of not only entertainment firms such as Pixar, but also content pro-
ducers such as James Cameron and George Lucas. Meanwhile, the Valley is 
not always on the pioneering side, as entrepreneurs and venture capital 
firms can sometimes get caught up in chasing “me too” start-ups, mining 
some trend that has already peaked. 
It all comes back to inputs, outputs, and appropriation mechanisms. 
All creative innovators are relying on inputs to develop their value-added 
outputs. While this relationship might be more visible in the expressive 
arts—because both the artistic inputs and outputs are generally presented to 
the public—it is no less true in behind-the-scenes technology advances. 
Innovative code and business models rarely rise ex nihilo. Instead they are 
built off existing code and business models. Code is built on code. Even if a 
developer writes a program completely from the ground up, he will certain-
ly be relying on other code he has read or written. If nothing else, the de-
veloper had to learn to code somewhere, and the programs one learned on 
are almost certain to influence one’s coding going forward—even when one 
is essentially trying to reject that old code to write something completely 
different and better to achieve a particular functionality.  
Thus, the apparent stance of large search and social media platform 
companies to undermine and marginalize copyright for content is not defen-
sible. Under the guise of a kind of open source ethic for content—usually 
under the banner of free speech and expression—these firms are simply 
trying to keep their input costs as low as possible while glossing over the 
fact that they vigorously control, protect, and monetize their outputs. Ulti-
mately, this is a dangerous game: the same arguments they use to devalue 
content (“information wants to be free”) can be used against their own pro-
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prietary positions. The key sleight of hand is that firms like Google seek to 
deflect attention from their own powerful proprietary technology appropria-
tions by minimizing their reliance on visible appropriation mechanisms, 
such as patents and copyright. This allows them to attack those forms of 
appropriation mechanisms (on which many of their competitors and input 
source providers rely) as regressive controls on A2K efforts, while safely 
keeping tight control of their own proprietary creative innovation through 
the alternate appropriation mechanisms of trade secrets and contract. At the 
same time, Google and other search and social media firms are increasingly 
turning to patents and copyright for market appropriation of their innova-
tions. Further, as even Google’s subsidiary of YouTube moves to create its 
own original content programming, the message will hopefully hit home 
that the appropriation mechanisms of both “innovators” and “creators” need 
to be respected as the artificial boundary between them more clearly breaks 
down in the digital ecosystem. 
Things may get worse before they get better, however. In a disturbing 
twist on the anti-copyright/creator rhetoric, some academics and an attorney 
at Google recently suggested that society would be better off if we took the 
IP rights, or even the life savings, from successful older artists so that they 
would have to go back on tour to earn money from live performances and 
produce new content. In part, this was based on Professor Glynn Lunney’s 
intriguing and provocative empirical research that seeks to show how re-
ductions in record sales as a result of file sharing content piracy have led to 
more new hits from existing artists.125 But, even if this is in fact true now, it 
is difficult to see how artists will continue to chase increasingly marginal 
returns by writing and recording new songs. At some point, the futility of 
this will set in and they will be forced to focus on other music or non-music 
revenue sources.  
Informally, a Google attorney adopted this perspective when he sug-
gested on a widely subscribed listserv that it was “a huge net social welfare 
gain” when musician Leonard Cohen had to start touring again to replace 
the money embezzled from him by his manager.126 But Cohen is eighty 
years old and he was already seventy when he first discovered the prob-
  
 125 Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Empirical Copyright: A Case Study of File Sharing and Music Output 1-3 
(Tulane Univ. Sch. of Law, Public Law & Legal Theory Working Paper Series No. 14-2, 2014), availa-
ble at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2372630. Lunney’s paper has been heavily 
critiqued for its methods and conclusions. See George S. Ford, What Is the Effect of File Sharing on the 
Creation of New Music? A Critical Review of “A Case Study of File Sharing and Music Output,” 
PHOENIX CTR. PERSP., Mar. 6, 2014, at 1, 1.  
 126 “[M]illions of fans were thrilled” and “Mr. Cohen’s revenues have been revitalized” through 
new touring revenues and the resultant live albums. This and the subsequent e-mail exchange occurred 
on the IP Profs listserv. Because of the semi-closed nature of that listserv, I am not disclosing the names 
of the parties here. The full exchange is on file with the editors of the George Mason Law Review, 
however. Further, to be clear, the attorney was not speaking on behalf of Google and was a member of 
the listserv in his capacity as a law school instructor.  
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lem.127 He had amassed a reasonable fortune for producing decades of criti-
cally acclaimed music and writings, which have influenced and inspired 
countless artists and individuals.128 Despite winning a lawsuit against the 
manager, he has not been able to collect any of the damages.129 Interesting-
ly, the attorney is a fan of Cohen and exhorted listserv members to go see 
this “global treasure.”130 This seems like a very odd way to show apprecia-
tion for respected elderly artists who have worked hard for decades and 
look forward to a reasonably secure retirement like any other successful 
individual. Along these lines, the attorney was queried as to whether society 
should expect the same of successful tech entrepreneurs—many of whom 
attempt to retire in their thirties or forties after only one or two “hits.” 
Among the start-up community, in my experience, there is indeed a senti-
ment that not enough great entrepreneurs continue building companies after 
finding success. There was no response to this proposal.131  
We can discuss the merits and ethics of capitalist systems in which 
some can amass substantial fortunes that allow them to retire early, while 
others must work for low pay until they are old, exhausted, and unable to 
work anymore. That is a legitimate political and philosophical debate. But, 
without some compelling differentiator, we cannot call for the taking away 
of some persons’ fortunes and not others. The pattern between tech found-
ers and artists is similar in this regard. The best in both fields passionately 
believe that they are changing the world for the better and are incentivized 
to give up everything else to pursue this vision both because it is the right 
thing to do and because they have reasonable expectations that they could 
become financially comfortable. Some individuals in both fields have de-
cided to retreat from their activities once they are financially secure. This 
ability to retire early—provided one has a big enough “hit”—may in fact 
incentivize some to work harder, gamble everything, and perhaps pursue 
even more audacious goals than one would if there was little chance of that 
  
 127 See Dan Glaister, Cohen Stays Calm as $5M Pension Disappears, GUARDIAN (Oct. 7, 2005, 
07:04 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2005/oct/08/usa.topstories3.  
 128 For example, Cohen’s song “Hallelujah” has been covered by over one-hundred artists in many 
languages, including versions by Bob Dylan, John Cale, and Jeff Buckley. Leonard Cohen, WIKIPEDIA, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Leonard_Cohen (last updated Feb. 14, 2015); Book Excerpt: Leonard 
Cohen’s “Hallelujah” in “The Holy or the Broken,” ROLLING STONE (Dec. 3, 2012), 
http://www.rollingstone.com/music/news/exclusive-book-excerpt-leonard-cohen-writes-hallelujah-in-
the-holy-or-the-broken-20121203.  
 129 See Glaister, supra note 127. 
 130 “But, most importantly, if you have not seen him perform these past few years, you must, no 
matter the ticket price. The man is a global treasure.” See source cited supra note 126. 
 131 The Google attorney’s comment was actually prompted by another post suggesting that indie 
artist Jeff Magnum had recently gotten more active in music again because the money from an earlier 
successful album had largely run out. The commenter was, again, a fan of the artist, and considered it 
perhaps bad that the fortunes that successful artists have been able to make allow them to retreat from 
the public and become recluses: “which situation is closer to copyright’s goals: the wealthy recluse, or 
the dragooned (though apparently happy) performer?” See source cited supra note 126. 
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“big hit.” But we cannot know this at the moment. At the same time, we can 
know that it is generally unfair to change the rules on someone after she has 
done her part. Further, it is reasonable to expect that individuals who live in 
societies where it is clear that there are no safeguards to property and con-
tracts—where a government can indeed simply swoop in at any time and 
take property or ignore/disrupt relied-upon legal relationships—will not be 
tremendously inclined to work hard at building up businesses or undertak-
ing activities that rely on property or contract rights.  
This is the fundamental point about the need for appropriation mecha-
nisms across both “innovative” and “creative” fields: without them, few 
would be able to realize or implement their visions with any degree of cer-
tainty that they would then get economic or attribution rights. Some might 
be willing to invest their own, and others’, time and resources to implement 
a vision just to give it away to all anonymously. But few could afford this, 
and it is clearly unsustainable except in non-capitalist societies. The only 
bedrock requirements to allow entrepreneurship, innovation, and creativity 
to take root are basic rule-of-law tenets like property, contracts, and reason-
ably steady and predictable systems of adjudication and enforcement. IP 
rights may well help these fields truly flourish, and we may generate IP-
type rights just from the basic notions of property, contracts, and privacy.132 
But without some kind of appropriation mechanisms we will not have sus-
tained innovation or creativity across various fields or genres that are pro-
fessionally implemented and fully realized. 
 
  
 132 For example, because individuals could keep their ideas, inventions, and creations secret, or 
limited to a small number of contractually bound individuals, we can easily take the next step and cre-
ate, by statute or case law, legal systems for allowing innovators and creators to fully implement their 
visions, and make them widely available to the public, on terms set in advance for all, or negotiated in 
each case. Arguably this is exactly what formal patent and copyright systems do. 
